Mixing Instruments ______________________________________________________________ DAVID M. DRIESEN This paper argues that effective climate policy may require a mixture of policy mechanisms to encourage technological development necessary to facilitate an eventual fossil fuel phase out. This idea contrasts with the view that broad global environmental benefit trading 1 offers a climate change panacea. The trading as panacea view suggests that the Kyoto Protocol's trading mechanisms assure adequate attention to renewable energy and that neither trading design nor technology policy measures are important as long as a broad and wide carbon market exists. This paper explains why this view is mistaken and puts forward the idea of taxing fossil fuels in order to pay for the introduction of more renewable energy, the use of other targeted programs to encourage renewable energy, and trading design principles to encourage technological progress.
This paper begins with an explanation of why renewable energy is important to efforts to address global climate change. The paper's second part presents data showing that global environmental benefit trading has not encouraged renewable energy as well as more targeted programs. This part of the paper also briefly presents some of the theoretical reasons to expect global trading to perform suboptimally in encouraging renewable energy.
The paper's final part discusses policy implications. It argues that the proper goal of policy should be to move toward an eventual phase-out of fossil fuels, rather than maximizing short-term cost minimization. It suggests a mix of policy tools and emissions trading design principles that can help move us toward this goal.
Practically all climate change experts recognize that meaningfully addressing climate change will require fundamental changes in the production and use of energy. Predictions of the amount of carbon reductions needed to avoid dangerous climate change tend to coalesce at around a 50 per cent global reduction by 2050, followed by even more drastic cuts. 2 Because developed countries like Canada have better technological capabilities than developing countries and bear historical responsibility for most of the problem, developed countries will need to produce substantially more than a 50 per cent reduction in national carbon emissions to make a worldwide cut of that magnitude possible. Since carbon dioxide, a product of fossil fuel combustion, accounts for about 80 per cent of the global warming potential of world greenhouse gas emissions, the overwhelming majority of these cuts must come from drastic reductions in the amount of fossil fuel burned.
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Achieving anything less than this creates a high probability of very serious consequences, such as melting polar ice caps, the inundation of much of Bangladesh, and widespread drought in Africa. 4 Seen in this light, a successful climate change program will deliver large short-term reductions in a manner that sets the stage for making more serious cuts in the future.
The economics of energy suggest that strategies employed now to reduce carbon emissions must contribute to lowering the price and increasing the utility of renewable energy in order to make more drastic future cuts feasible. Economists frequently use topdown approaches to modelling the costs of addressing climate change, relying on basic macroeconomic data about the effects of previous rises in energy costs. 5 This approach, which implicitly assumes that our technological capabilities today resemble those of the 1970s, sometimes generates numbers so high that they raise serious questions about whether the world's governments would ever agree to make the reductions needed to avoid dangerous climate change. 6 Yet, some bottom-up models, which consider current technologies available to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 7 predict that the drastic cuts scientists call for can be achieved at zero net cost, meaning no more cost than continuing with business as usual would generate. 8 The history of renewable energy suggests that its employment will cost much less in the future than it does today, if appropriate policies support its development. We have seen large decreases in the cost of all forms of renewable energy as manufacturers learn how to more efficiently deploy renewable energy with increased production opportunities. 12 Indeed, wind power has become competitive with fossil fuels as a source of peak generating power. Generally, progress has been most dramatic in countries and regions with supportive policies. 13 It is reasonable to assume that with appropriate policies, costs can continue to fall.
By contrast, continued reliance on fossil fuels presents grave risks to the economy and our security, not just to the environment. Since fossil fuels are finite resources, their price will eventually rise and then they will run out. If we fail to implement policies that will stimulate development, refinement, and deployment of alternative technologies, these price increases and shortages will likely prove very disruptive.
To put it another way, we will stop using oil and coal as energy sources sooner or later, because they will cease to exist. The only question is whether we switch to alternatives before or after we commit the atmosphere to very dangerous global warming. 
Trading, Targeted Incentives, and Renewable Energy
The literature on trading suggests that it encourages innovation, which might lead one to suspect that the trading of carbon credits will stimulate large increases in the production of renewable energy. So far, trading does not seem to have done so. China and India add significant amounts of coal powered-generating capacity to their power grids every year. 16 One might object that this does not represent a failure of trading, but rather the lack of caps on those countries. But that is precisely the point. Cap-and-trade programs' environmental improvements come from the caps, not from the trading. The trading simply provides a means of lowering the cost of meeting the environmentally valuable carbon reductions required by setting strict caps. Cap-and-trade programs must demand large carbon reductions from very significant sectors of the economy in order to provide a meaningful impetus for carbon reduction.
At first glance, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Kyoto Protocol's trading program allowing developing countries to provide emission reduction credits to offset emissions in the developed world, seems to provide a countervailing force. The majority of CDM projects involve renewable energy. But a more careful analysis makes the countervailing force vanish. One should evaluate CDM distribution by carbon credits, because this gives a picture of how much of the greenhouse gas reductions being provided come from renewable energy. An evaluation of the distribution of carbon credits reveals that renewable energy has provided approximately 17 per cent of the total credits, and energy efficiency, which is vital to renewable energy's long-term prospects, constitutes a paltry 10 per cent. 17 End-of-the-pipe control, as figure 12.1 shows, generates the lion's share of the credits.
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The main reason that trading encourages end-of-the-pipe controls is that the market favours the cheapest means of meeting greenhouse gas reductions. End-of-the-pipe projects controlling emissions of potent greenhouse gases, such as HFC 23, cost less than most renewable energy projects on a dollar per carbon dioxide equivalent basis. 18 The data available so far reflect only the experience with the reductions encouraged by Phase I of the European Union's emissions trading scheme (ETS) and the newly proposed stricter targets in Phase II. The limits imposed on pollution sources create demand for credits, making the ETS the primary driver of private sector purchases. One would expect the role of renewable energy to increase somewhat as targets become stricter, as they will in phase two of this two-part scheme.
However, competition among CDM projects will tend to encourage the cheapest emissions reductions. This means that the market does not systematically account for renewable energy's long-term and non-carbon advantages, that is, its capacity to contribute to long-term technological advances and its ability to limit conventional air 28 This can make firms, especially firms that control lucrative conventional technologies, reluctant to invest in innovation, which is a major driver of economic prosperity. The collateral benefits of reduced conventional air pollution also constitute a positive spillover that carbon markets do not encourage firms to internalize. This means that even with optimal carbon targets, an emissions trading program does not provide optimal incentives for broadly rational technological choices unless supplemented with some corrective mechanism. This suggests that governments should supplement carbon markets with more targeted measures aimed at advancing technology.
A Mix of Policies
Instrument selection reflects implicit normative choices. For the most part, writers assume that the norm of minimizing the short-term cost of meeting a given carbon reduction goal should govern instrument selection, and therefore use a short efficiency criterion to guide instrument choice. In the climate change context, however, society should instead choose a goal of pushing the price differential between renewables and fossil fuels to a tipping point where renewable energy becomes the more economic option. This goal commends itself because of the significant costs associated with failing to avoid dangerous climate change. 29 If one wants to avoid those costs, then maximizing long-term technological change is more important than minimizing short-term costs.
While we can expect some movement in this direction to occur through scarcity-induced increases in fossil fuel prices, this price-induced change will not move the world toward the drastic cuts we need to meaningfully address global warming in a timely manner. The question is: What can be done to make this change happen?
New Economic Incentive Programs
The goal of encouraging a shift from fossil fuels to renewables suggests that we should tax fossil fuels to fund renewable energy. Mikael Skou Andersen has pointed out that systems that employ this kind of approach, employing a negative economic incentive to fund a positive economic incentive, can effectively encourage innovation. 30 This approach sends a signal that private actors should invest in alternatives to fossil fuels, instead of building new coal-fired plants with years of useful life ahead of them that pump large amounts of carbon into the atmosphere.
This proposal also helps rectify the problem of fossil fuel subsidies artificially delaying the introduction of renewable energy by making fossil fuels too cheap relative to renewable energy. 31 Of course, that observation leads to the question, why not simply abolish fossil fuel subsidies? Abolishing fossil fuel subsidies would be a good idea, although we probably need to increase positive incentives for renewable energy as well.
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But eliminating long established subsidies from tax codes and government budgets may prove even more politically difficult than enacting a bold new program to shift the incentives in the right direction.
China provides an example of deliberate government use of tax incentives to meet sustainable development goals. China has taxed CDM projects differentially, imposing high taxes on projects generating carbon credits through end-of-the-pipe controls of industrial gases while imposing low taxes on renewable energy. 33 Furthermore, China has announced an intention to fund renewable energy. 34 It is at least possible that some of the funds for the renewables will come from taxes on less desirable CDM projects. China, then, has created incentives that favour renewable energy, which makes sense for the climate and economic development. It would be even better policy to tax the generation of carbon, rather than carbon reductions, to fund renewable energy.
An Environmental Competition Statute, which also funds positive economic incentives with negative economic incentives, has the potential to avoid many of the governmental weaknesses that tend to interfere with the achievement of ambitious goals, like those needed to address global warming. Such a statute would simply authorize any entity lowering its carbon dioxide emissions to recoup the costs incurred in reducing its carbon output from a competitor of its choosing that has higher emissions, along with a pre-set premium. 35 It allows the capacity of the most environmentally progressive entities in an industry to establish benchmarks that other companies must adhere to if they wish to avoid paying competitors. It thus encourages a race to maximize environmental performance, comparable to the race to improve product quality that can occur because of market share concerns in highly competitive markets.
This approach helps avoid a problem with emissions trading and pollution taxes; namely, their dependence on tough government decision-making. Trading can only work when government officials set ambitious caps. Similarly, pollution taxes only provide significant reduction incentives if officials set reasonably high tax rates. The
Environmental Competition Statute allows the capabilities of the most environmentally capable companies to drive programmatic achievements, relying on the government only to set up a law requiring these sorts of payments and establishing the profit margin that companies besting their competitors will be awarded through the premium. In this approach the limited bravery of government officials in setting caps or tax rates does not limit the programs' achievements.
Sectoral Programs
Countries can expand and strengthen the sectoral programs that have proven more successful than trading in stimulating renewables, such as renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs. These programs can include demand-side management programs for electric utilities and energy efficiency standards for appliances and vehicles. 
Trading Design
While an environmental benefit trading program offers a suboptimal tool for stimulating relatively expensive renewable energy, renewable energy can play a role in such programs. A country can maximize that role by attending to the following design principles if it employs environmental benefit or emissions trading.
STRICT CAPS
Ambitious caps requiring large emission reductions will raise the cost of compliance sufficiently to make some renewable energy viable. While those purchasing credits will still prefer to avoid relatively expensive renewables in favour of lower cost conventional options, they may find some purchase of renewable credits unavoidable if they must purchase large volumes of credits in order to comply. And, of course, strict caps ameliorate climate change more effectively than lax caps, simply because they lower the amount of carbon warming the earth.
LIMITED OFFSETS
A country that wishes to make sure that its credit purchases make a long-term contribution to sustainable development can limit the classes of projects eligible for offset credits and the amount of offsets that are allowed. Indeed, a country could accept only renewable energy projects as offsets, thereby ruling out projects that contribute little to the long-term process of technological development to facilitate fossil fuel replacement. 37 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a program to limit utility emissions in the northeastern states, provides quantitative and qualitative limits on offsets in order to protect the program's environmental integrity.
LIMITED BREADTH
Large linked markets will tend to maximize cost savings, thereby dropping the cost of credits. 39 These cost drops reduce incentives for expensive innovation. This point is consistent with economic models of taxes, which link higher tax rates to greater innovation rates. Narrower programs stimulate valuable high-cost innovation better than broad ones, by limiting the availability of cheap conventional credits.
INPUT ALLOWANCES
A program limiting the total amount of fossil fuel consumed through tradable allowances in dirty inputs (such as coal and oil) will better encourage innovation than a broad program focused on end-of-the pipe allowances. 40 It will also prove much easier to monitor and enforce. Such a program can reach the transport sector, which has been left out of caps enacted so far, thereby allowing for a comprehensive economy-wide cap.
Some of the bills pending in the United States Congress use a variant on this idea to create an economy-wide cap. 
Conclusion
A tension exists between maximizing short-term cost effectiveness and maximizing longterm investments needed to address global warming. We can creatively employ a mixture of policy tools to maximize incentives to shift away from fossil fuels to cleaner approaches.
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